complainants sought the constitution with his request for a temporary injunction prohibiting definitive statements in connection with German guarantee the "Euro-rescue."
As part of the global financial crisis, the situation of public finances in the Member States of the EU had deteriorated considerably. In particular, the Hellenic Republic was in financial difficulties and needs for the year 2010 with an increase in public debt to 125% of the gross domestic product and expect more than twice the reference value of 60%. In order to provide the financial stability of the entire euro zone, therefore, declared the states of the euro group at the request of Greece in May 2010 prepared in connection with a three-year program of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide substantial financial assistance.
In the wake together the leaders of the euro group in Brussels, saying, among other things, in favor of strengthening the economic regulators in the euro area and to regulate the financial markets and combat the intense speculation. To this end, they agreed that the Commission should propose a European stabilization mechanism to preserve financial stability in Europe, the so-called "Euro-rescue." Then decided on 09.05.2010, the Council on Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN Council) to establish a European stabilization mechanism. It consists of the measure based on a EU regulation European financial stabilization mechanism (EFSM) on one side and out of the European financial stabilization facility (EFSF), an intergovernmental agreement on the Member States of the euro-group-based special purpose vehicle to provide loans and lines of credit, on the other. They aim to Member States affected by exceptional events of difficulties will be supported financially. The European Central Bank (ECB) participated on 10/05/2010 at the new protection program by deciding to buy government bonds. Regulation No 407/2010
of the Council of 11.05.2010 based on a European financial stabilization mechanism, thereby to Article 122 para 2 TFEU. Thereafter, a Member State which is due to exceptional events that are beyond its control, difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties is a financial assistance of the EU are granted. The Council considers that the exceptional situation would be that the tightening has led the global financial crisis for several Member States of the Euro-group to a serious deterioration in credit conditions that goes beyond what can be explained by economic fundamentals. The European financial stabilization mechanism shall remain in force as long as necessary to maintain financial market stability is required, and a financial budget of up to include 60 billion euros, which makes borrowing would be necessary.
addition to the introduction of the EFSM the Heads of State and Government the Euro-Group is required to be effected through the special purpose vehicle EFSF financial assistance. For this purpose entity agreed by the participating Member States guarantee in accordance with their constitutional requirements in proportion to their paid-up capital of the ECB. The EU Commission, in the context of EFSF by the Member States of the euro group for the execution of contracts are used. With regard to the SPV through the following terms were agreed. Shareholders of companies incorporated under the laws of Luxembourg special purpose vehicle, all Member States of the Euro Group. Its purpose is the issuance of bonds and the granting of loans and credit lines to cover Financing needs of Member States in difficulty of the Euro Group.
result of the share of Germany in the capital of the ECB, the German share amounts to the guaranteed volume to 123 billion euros, in the case of unforeseen and compelling need, the amount may be exceeded by a further 20%, so therefore a maximum of around 148 billion Euro results. The total volume of the stabilization instruments in the amount of 750 billion € is calculated from the volume of the EFSM in the amount of 60 billion euros, the volume of EFSF in the amount of 440 billion euros and a (previously only expected) contribution from the IMF amounting to half of that sums, so further 250 billion Euro. create
To be on the national level for the delivery of financial assistance to the SPV EFSF, the German Bundestag adopted on 21.05.2010 the impugned law on acquisition of warranties as part of a European stabilization mechanism, to be approved by the Bundesrat on the same day and was promulgated on 22.05.2010.
Following approval of the €-stabilization mechanism Act by the Federal Council of the complainant on 21.05.2010 constitutional complaint, acc. Article 90 No 4 GG, § § 13 No. 8, § § 90 ff applicable Federal Constitutional Court Act and requested to issue a temporary injunction, acc. Federal Constitutional Court Act § 32.
The constitutional complaint seeking a declaration that the complainant's acts and omissions on German and European level disproportionate to his basic rights and fundamental rights, equal rights under Article 38 I GG; engage Article 14 and Article 2 I GG I GG. The €-stabilization mechanism in breach of Article 125 I TFEU. These are not merely occasional breach of contract, but destroys the agreement provided for long term stability Union, replacing it with a liability and transfer union. The parties to the legislative bodies would be subject to such a far-reaching change in the contract ratification requirement of Article 23 I GG in conjunction with Article 79 GG, they would not have considered. The commitments could be even parliamentary answer why not, because it completely unclear what would be done under conditions closer warranties in this blatant level ever. The stabilization mechanism in the euro-law pronounced warranty authorization in the amount of 147.6 billion € can also be factually not justify parliamentary-democratic. The legislators go of his responsibility for the household and community well, if he decides to future financial years of this magnitude in advance lays down.
Article 14 I GG was violated because the measures currently under consideration by the buying of government bonds the ECB, the stability of the European currency undermined. This would be the subject of monetary stability protected content and limits provisions of Article 88 of the Basic Law and the stability requirements of the European treaties, notices.
The request for a temporary injunction sought, the complainant, the President prohibited until a decision on the merits, to announce the €-stabilization mechanism Act. In the alternative, he sought to prohibit the Federal Ministry of Finance to make use of the stabilization mechanism in the euro-law provided for warranty authorization. Further alternative, he sought, the Federal Ministry of Finance give up to make use of the warranty authorization in such manner that guarantees or other forms of guarantee under the condition be made that the guarantee or other indemnity from the start is void if the Federal Constitutional Court on the merits, the unconstitutionality of the €-stabilization mechanism Law says.
A delay of the warranty acquisition will lead to the complainant's view, the absence of an acute emergency situation to any significant disadvantages for the common good. The damage for the euro currency system from the implementation of the decisions on the euro-stabilizing mechanism arises, on the other hand was immeasurable. For the Federal Republic of Germany could also arise, given the volume of the proposed guarantees, which accounts for more than half the federal budget, a huge loss, when they should once received guarantees will be honored.
An application for an interim order had been closed with the announcement of the €-stabilization mechanism Act on 22.05.2010, if the President should be permitted to declare the impugned law. Moreover, the application is, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, also unfounded.
According to § 32 I BVerfGG the Federal Constitutional Court may in case of dispute a state with interim measures governing pending if this is necessary to avert serious detriment, to prevent imminent violence or some other important reason for the common good urgency. In considering whether the conditions of § 32 I BVerfGG given, because of the far-reaching consequences of a constitutional court for interim relief on a regular basis to create a stricter standard that will be aggravated further when a measure of international law or foreign policy impact is concerned. It must be reasons that speak for the unconstitutionality of the challenged action, disregarded, unless the coveted mainly Determination were found to be inadmissible or manifestly unfounded from the start. The Federal Constitutional Court here merely to weigh the disadvantages that were to take place when a temporary restraining order was not, the constitutional complaint, but would in the main success, against the disadvantages that would follow if the requested interim measures would be adopted, in the main, however, the success of would fail.
An application for the coveted arrangement remains regardless of whether the application in view of the fact that before the announcement was made by the constitutional complaint challenged the law, would be inadmissible, as well as other open questions of the admissibility and merits of the constitutional complaint in any case without due consideration of the necessary consequence of success.
absence the interim order, turns out to be an exercise of the warranty authorization later than the constitutionally permitted to threaten the public, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, serious drawbacks.
The "Euro-rescue" and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB to counteract a loss of confidence in the solvency of individual states of the Euro Group. The Federal Republic of Germany with the process under these safeguards in their economic performance, a significant proportion. Would the Federal Republic Germany, which is in the financial markets as a fully solvent through the adoption of the much sought interim relief on their commitments also have to suspend temporarily, this could lead to assessment of the federal government already led to a confidence loss in the markets, the consequences are not foreseeable.
This assessment of the federal government but not shared by the complainant, who sees the measures just for the stability of the European currency rather additional risks. The Constitutional Court can, however, the proceedings for interim relief that question does not inform them, and must do so not because of a forecast of market reactions looking assessment of the federal government is certainly not disproved. In the assessment of foreign policy situations, expect to here the situation of international financial markets, the federal government comes in violent part system because of their professional competence to their particular closeness and its political authorities assess priority to the subject of clear refutation has to be respected by the Federal Constitutional Court .
Even a temporary withdrawal of Germany from the emergency measures would not only the volume of the "Euro-emergency parachute" to lessen in proportion, but could, according to the Federal Government the feasibility of the rescue package, at least from the perspective of financial markets are altogether. That would give the general public expected to have significant economic disadvantages. Should be missed by the €-stabilization mechanism objective, therefore, the potential threat of illiquidity in major trading centers of European government bonds can not be avoided, would be considered by the federal government threatens the stability of the entire European Monetary Union. The Constitutional Court does not have sufficient evidence that force one to believe that monetary and fiscal policy assessment of the federal government has failed. Evidence of excess the boundaries of the assessment discretion by not obviously durable assumptions and conclusions can not after.
contrast, less severely outweigh the disadvantages that arise when the interim relief is not granted.
A substantial damage arising for the common good not the mere possibility of using the federal case in the entrance, so the threat of a state of emergency € group whose probability the federal government continues to be low. The complainant has presented no concrete evidence that contrast their basic rights and fundamental rights, equal rights, in particular of Article 14 I GG, just straight in a row a possible acquisition of credit or guarantees the repurchase of government bonds by the ECB could already be seriously compromised and irreversibly. As far as the complainant contends, the disappointment of the legal trust by his allegations that his violation of the European treaties would lead to irreversible damage to the common currency, it is thus in conflict with the of assessment of the Federal Government which has to respect the Constitutional Court for the reasons mentioned.
Conclusion: The present decision, of course, is similar to the decision of the Constitutional Court from 07.05.2010 - 2 BvR 987/10 constitutional complaint with the interim order against the monetary policy of the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the, to stabilize the European currency area, the Hellenic Republic of grants awarded (see the blog entry from 19.05.2010). The complainant also felt in their basic rights and fundamental rights equal rights under Article 38 I GG, 14 I violated the Basic Law and Article 2 I GG. A significant damage to the common good is, however, in both cases arise not from the possibility of using the federal government. Both applicants have also submitted no evidence that their fundamental right under Article 14 I GG could be directly affected, especially in consequence, guaranteed financial aid. On the professional competence, specific knowledge of assessment-based proximity and political accountability of the legislature to respect the assessment of foreign policy situations, such as the position of the international financial markets, while the Constitutional Court.
BVerfG v. 09.06.2010 - 2 BvR 1099/10
Federal Constitutional Court press release No 38/2010 dated 06/10/2010
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